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CORPORATE MOBILITY AND COMPANY LAW 
Eilís Ferran 
 
Globalisation has given commercial parties more freedom to choose the company law 
system that best suits their private needs. The growing range of techniques to facilitate 
choice between systems of company law reshapes the mandatory/enabling debate in 
countries where corporate mobility is a relatively new business phenomenon and where 
the past focus has mostly been on degrees of flexibility within domestic law. This article 
examines relocations, both out of and into the UK, as a source of learning on market 
preferences with respect to company law and on vulnerabilities. It considers the wider 
policy implications for the development of company law of more freedom of choice 
between company law systems. It concludes with a call to explore the potential for more 
optionality within company law to counter the rise of choice between systems of 
company law. 
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CORPORATE MOBILITY AND COMPANY LAW  
 
(A)  Introduction 
 
Globalisation has given commercial parties more freedom to choose the system of 
company law that best suits their private needs and has made where to incorporate a 
factor in many strategic decisions about the desired focus of a business’s future 
operations. Whilst tax planning is a well-known and often controversial driver of 
business decisions by multinational companies regarding location choices,1 tax 
residency and place of incorporation need not necessarily go hand in hand since, with 
appropriate planning, they can be disaggregated (or unbundled).2 The long list of 
considerations that can lie behind the decision to incorporate a company in one 
jurisdiction rather than another thus extends far beyond taxation matters. Forming a 
                                               
1 H. Eidenmüller, A. Engert and L. Hornufe, ‘Where Do Firms Issue Debt? An Empirical Analysis of 
Issuer Location and Regulatory Competition in Europe’ (2015) 41 International Review of Law and Economics 
103. 
2 To take the UK case, whilst a company incorporated in the UK is UK tax resident (subject to certain 
limited exceptions), a company not incorporated in the UK will also be UK tax resident if it is centrally 
managed and controlled in the UK: D. Hughes, Corporate Residence (Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury 
Professional, 2013).  UK tax residency is subject to the application of ‘tiebreaker’ provisions in double tax 
treaties, which may result in residence being allocated to a different state:  ibid.  
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local subsidiary may be a way for a cross-border business to overcome the lack of trust 
in foreign companies among customers and business partners.3 Eligibility for admission 
to trading on particular exchanges or market segments can be another potential driver 
of jurisdictional choice,4 although, as with tax residency, the incorporation location does 
not dictate listing location as they can be different. Public and private international law 
may also impinge on corporate structuring decisions, such as in relation to bilateral 
investment treaties where standing to claim will depend on nationality and thus may 
require the establishment of special purpose corporate vehicles incorporated in 
appropriate jurisdictions.5  Corporate location may be deliberately chosen in order to 
opt into (or to avoid) a particular accounting framework (notably IFRS) or a dedicated 
regulatory regime (such as the UK Takeover Code).  
                                               
3 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
single-member private companies (2014)COM 212, 2. 
4 eg, third country issuers seeking admission to official listing in the EU face an extra hurdle in that they 
must satisfy the listing authority that the absence of home country listing is not due to a need to protect 
investors (implemented in the UK by the FCA Listing Rules (LR): LR 6.1.21 and LR 14.2.4). Other 
examples include:  an issuer seeking admission to the London Stock Exchange’s High Growth Segment 
must be a trading company incorporated in an EEA State; and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange requires 
issuers to be incorporated in an ‘acceptable’ jurisdiction and imposes additional shareholder protection 
requirements on those that are not.  
5 R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2012), 52-54. 
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Many jurisdictions still lack a straightforward regime for established companies to 
move their registered offices across borders6 but commercial practice has developed 
functional solutions to fill the gap, at least for more sophisticated actors that can afford 
to access the technology and, where moving involves separating the place of 
incorporation from tax residency and/or the location of listing, to absorb the ongoing 
costs of managing compliance with multiple regimes. Within the EU there is the 
possibility to transfer the registered office of an existing public company through the 
formation of a European Company7 or through a cross-border merger in accordance 
                                               
6 After consideration of the pros and cons, in December 2007 the European Commission decided that 
there was no need for action at the EU level.  The Commission conducted a further consultation exercise 
on the matter in 2013 but this has not since led to regulatory action. 
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute of the European Company (SE) 
[2001] OJ L294/1, Art 8. By way of example, in 2011-12 the UK plc Scotty Group converted to an SE to 
move to Austria in order to secure cost savings and to align its legal and financial structure more logically 
with its geographic focus. As at end October 2015 there were over 2400 established SEs in total. The 
registered office and the head office of an SE must be in the same Member State: Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2157/2001, Art 7. The proposed Directive on single-member private limited companies (COM(2014) 
212) would allow for the transfer of the registered office from one Member State to another through the 
formation of a single member private limited liability company (SUP) if it is allowed by the national laws 
of both Member States.  
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with procedures giving effect to the EU Cross-border Mergers Directive.8  The transfer 
of a registered office can be achieved by setting up a subsidiary in the destination 
Member State and then merging the existing company into the subsidiary. Other 
alternatives lie in creative use of general mergers and acquisitions structures. One 
possibility is the reverse takeover, whereby a smaller company takes over a larger one 
and the shareholders in the target become the majority shareholders in the bidder. This 
structure can be used to change the location of a group holding company and has 
become associated with ‘inversions’ effected to take advantage of lower tax rates in 
                                               
8 Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-
border mergers of limited liability companies [2005] OJ L310/1.  English cases decided under the 
implementing Companies (Cross-Border Mergers) Regulations 2007  (SI 2007/2974) include: Re Nielsen 
Holdings plc [2015] EWHC 2966 (Ch) (absorption of Dutch company by English company); Re International 
Game Technology Plc [2015] EWHC 717 (Ch) (merger of Italian parent into English subsidiary); Re Lanber 
Properties LLP [2014] EWHC 4713 (Ch) (merger of German companies into English LLP); Re Olympus Ltd 
[2014] EWHC 1350 (Ch) (merger of English companies by absorption into German company/SE); Re 
Honda Motor Europe Ltd [2014] EWHC 919 (Ch)  and Re Honda Motor Europe Ltd [2013] EWHC 2789 (Ch) 
(mergers by absorption of Italian and Spanish subsidiaries of English company);  Re Sigma Tau 
Pharmaceutical Ltd [2013] EWHC 3279 (Ch) (merger by absorption of Portuguese company by English 
sister company); Re House-Clean Ltd [2013] EWHC 2337 (Ch) (merger of English subsidiary into German 
parent); Re Diamond Resorts (Europe) Ltd [2012] EWHC 3576 (Ch) (Spanish subsidiaries absorbed by 
English company); Re Itau BBA International Ltd [2012] EWHC 1783 (Ch) (merger of Portuguese company 
into English company); Re Wood DIY Ltd [2011] EWHC 3089 (Ch) (merger of Italian company into English 
company); Re Oceanrose Investments Ltd [2008] EWHC 3475 (Ch) (merger of English and Italian 
companies).    
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destination countries.9 Another possibility is the ‘holdco scheme of arrangement’, a 
court-supervised statutory process that enables a new holding company incorporated in 
the desired destination jurisdiction to be inserted at the top of an existing corporate 
group.10  Complex deals may involve a combination of structures, as in the case of the 
                                               
9 Especially by US companies, as a step to avoid paying US tax on global income. This motivation has 
been attributed to a number of companies that have moved from the US to the UK, such as Aon (2012),   
Rowan (2012) and Ensco (2010): T. Bergin, ‘Britain Becomes Haven for U.S. Companies Keen to Cut Tax 
Bills’ Reuters Business News, 9 June 2014 at  http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-usa-tax-insight-
idUSKBN0EK0BF20140609.  The issue acquired high political saliency:  ‘Even as corporate profits are as 
high as ever, a small but growing group of big corporations are fleeing the country to get out of paying 
taxes. They’re keeping most of their business inside the United States, but they’re basically renouncing 
their citizenship and declaring that they’re based somewhere else, just to avoid paying their fair share.’:   
President Obama as quoted in E.L. Talley, ‘Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory 
Competition’ (2015) 101 Virginia Law Review 1649, 1650. The official US response was to tighten 
progressively the rules governing certain tax-planning techniques: US Treasury and IRS, Notice 2014-52, 
Rules Regarding Inversions and Related Transactions, September 2014; US Treasury and IRS, Notice 
2015-79, Additional Rules Regarding Inversions and Related Transactions, November 2015;  US Treasury 
Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Inversion Regulations and Proposed Earnings Stripping Regulations, 4 April 
2016, at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0404.aspx. The merger of Pfizer 
with Allergan to move the headquarters from the US to Ireland, announced in November 2015 but 
scrapped in April 2016, was a casualty of the regulatory crackdown.  
10 In the UK, schemes of arrangement are governed by Companies Act 2006, Pt 26. Other systems of 
company law in the English law ‘family’ have similar arrangements, eg: Corporations Act 2001, Pt 5.1 
(Australia); Companies Ordinance 2014, Pt 13.2 (Hong Kong);  Companies Act 2006, Pt VII (Singapore); 
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Iberia/British Airways merger to create International Airlines Group (IAG), a holding 
company which is incorporated in Spain, has its head office in London and is premium 
listed on the London Stock Exchange.11 This is not to say that the majority of companies 
are constantly on the move ― the number of companies taking advantage of these 
various structures is still quite low compared to the overall population of listed and 
quoted companies12 ― but the level of activity has been sufficient to indicate that this 
aspect of jurisdictional corporate mobility is on the rise as a strategic choice.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Companies (Jersey) Law 1991, Pt 18A. See, generally, J. Payne, Schemes of Arrangement: Theory, Structure 
and Operation (CUP, 2014) ch 8.  
11 The merger required, among other steps, a restructuring (via a ‘hive down’) of the Iberia Group, a 
restructuring of the BA group (via a scheme of arrangement) and the merger pursuant to the Spanish 
Law on Structural Modifications to Companies: Merger Project between International Consolidated 
Airlines Group SA and Iberia, Líneas Aéreas De España, SA and BA HoldCo SA (2010), at    
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/24/240949/mergerplan.pdf. 
12 For example, the database PLC What Market. Reorganisations and Schemes. Schemes of Arrangement 
indicates that between 2013 and 2014 just five companies used a holdco scheme of arrangement to 
relocate from the UK (MXC Capital plc to Guernsey (2014); Sarossa Capital plc to Jersey (2014); Kofax plc 
to Bermuda (2013); Kryso Resources plc to Cayman Islands (2013); Randall & Quilter Investment 
Holdings plc to Bermuda (2013)). In the same period, just two companies used equivalent Channel 
Islands laws to migrate into the UK (Assura Group Ltd from Guernsey (2013); Informa plc from Jersey 
(2013)). WPP announced a holdco scheme of arrangement in 2012, completed in early 2013 but this 
scheme did not change the location of the holding company (Jersey).  In addition, in 2013 UMC Energy 
plc used a reduction of capital (without a scheme) to make a UK company the wholly-owned subsidiary 
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US scholars have led the way in examining whether the extension of freedom of choice 
between systems of company law (‘regulatory competition’) is a force for good (‘race to 
the top’) or bad (‘race to the bottom’), with shareholder rights as the reference point.13 
EU corporate law scholarship has also embraced the theme of corporate mobility and its 
consequences but the European debate has tended to have a different emphasis, in part 
because of the persistence of certain legal barriers to cross-border mobility that are 
related to the ‘real seat’ rule of corporate recognition that is followed in the legal 
systems of some Member States. The Court of Justice of the European Union has played 
a vital role in eroding these barriers but the authorities are complex and can be hard to 
unravel. Gerner-Beuerle and Schillig14  have described one of the recent cases as ‘a 
judgment that in its English version is at times barely comprehensible’ and their 
comment that it ‘introduces new subtleties and complexities’ gives a flavour of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
of a Cayman Island parent.  But as is clear from the text, schemes of arrangements only reveal part of the 
picture.  
13 Shareholder rights are at the heart of the ‘law and finance’ approach to corporate governance, whereby 
quantitative analysis is deployed to measure investor protection. The seminal article is R. La Porta, F. 
Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 
1113.  
14 C. Gerner-Beuerle and M. Schillig, ‘The Mysteries of Freedom of Establishment After Cartesio’ (2010) 59 
ICLQ 303.  
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challenges involved in navigating a ‘rules jungle’15. With so much scholarly effort going 
into understanding and assessing the effect of the cases, it is perhaps not surprising that 
questions about the broader implications of corporate mobility have sometimes been 
pushed into second place.  
 
This article, though European in its geographical orientation, is not concerned with 
doctrinal analysis of the CJEU jurisprudence since the breakthrough Centros decision in 
1999.16  Building on the rich scholarship that has traversed those complexities, the 
starting point here is that for larger companies, corporate mobility, for both 
incorporation and reincorporation, has become a reality thanks to commercial 
ingenuity. Practice has moved at a quicker pace than the developments in the case law. 
The emphasis here is therefore on the implications of this extended choice for the 
development of company law. The specific jurisdictional focus for this inquiry is the 
UK. As an EU Member State, the UK does not have an entirely free hand to adjust its 
company laws to keep pace with extended corporate mobility. Corporate law 
                                               
15 T. Biermeyer, ‘Shaping the Space of Cross-border Conversions in the EU: Between Right and 
Autonomy: VALE’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 571, 571. Also sharing the view that ‘the case law on corporate 
mobility remains an area of considerable complexity’: A. Khan, ‘Corporate Mobility, Market Access and 
the Internal Market’ (2015) 40 EL Rev 371, 389; and that ‘there remain a number of conceptual difficulties: 
J. Borg-Barthet, ‘Free at Last? Choice of Corporate Law in the EU Following the Judgment in Vale’ [2013] 
ICLQ 503, 511. 
16 Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459. 
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regulatory capacity at the EU level is growing as can be seen from the proposed 
revisions to the Shareholder Rights Directive, which in addressing the exercise of voting 
rights, shareholder engagement, directors’ remuneration and related party transactions, 
will to an unprecedented extent reach into matters of ‘core’ company law for companies 
that are incorporated in an EU Member State and admitted to trading on an EU 
regulated market.17 The implications of a shift of regulatory power to Brussels and how 
that could increasingly shape corporate sentiment about the attractiveness of the UK as 
an incorporation or listing venue are significant and require separate analysis. At this 
juncture, however, the pertinent point is that national policymakers retain sufficient 
control over the design of company law systems for it to be appropriate still to locate an 
inquiry into the policy implications of extended choice primarily at the domestic level.   
 
The first substantive question that the article addresses arises from corporate 
emigration and concerns what the UK can learn about market preferences with respect 
to its system of company law as a result of this dimension of extended freedom of 
choice. Certain practices followed by companies that have relocated from the UK to 
Jersey, one of the Channel Islands, are drawn upon to inform this discussion. The article 
                                               
17 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of 
certain rights of shareholders in listed companies [2007] OJ L184/17, art 1(1) (subject-matter and scope).  
The proposal to revise the Directive (COM(2014) 213) is proceeding through the  EU legislative process. 
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then turns to immigration and, in particular, the ‘downside’ of corporate mobility from 
the arrival country standpoint. This part of the article considers two notorious cases 
where the adoption of UK corporate citizenship by essentially foreign businesses 
exposed weaknesses in the domestic legal and regulatory framework, and examines the 
policy response. But it cautions against a blinkered approach that is focused solely on 
the risks associated with immigration to the exclusion of its potentially benign effects. 
The article then turns to the wider policy implications for the development of company 
law of more freedom of choice between company law systems. Policymakers need to 
think hard about global competitiveness and the kind of corporate businesses they want 
to attract or retain. The natural urge to impose regulatory solutions to protect society 
from the harmful effects of corporate mobility has a legitimate place in the analysis of 
policy choices but not, it is argued, to the complete exclusion of other possibilities to 
ensure a rounded response both the positives and the negatives of extended corporate 
choice.  The article concludes with a call to explore the potential for more optionality 
within company law to counter the rise of choice between systems. Fighting fire with 
fire can be dangerous but in this context it holds promise. A more choice-based 
approach could be expected to lessen the incentives for domestic companies to explore 
the options offered by expanded choice between systems. It would make the emergence 
of an uneven playing field ― where less well-resourced companies bear the brunt of 
heavy-handed interventions that eventually turn out to be policy mistakes ― less likely. 
By being more accommodating of robust governance features that are less familiar in 
the UK context because of the predominance of the dispersed shareholder model, it 
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could be good for competitiveness. And by fostering diversity and plurality, it could 
help to moderate the extremes of shareholder primacy and thereby advance the 
fundamental policy objective for companies to achieve their social purpose.   
 
One final introductory point. In practice and in scholarship, it is not unusual for 
company (or corporate) law to be interpreted in a broad way to include listing rules and 
capital market disclosure requirements and, often, little turns on this extended 
approach. After all, capital market regulation has encroached significantly on matters 
that, historically, would have been treated as aspects of company law. This article 
adopts the extended approach but with due regard to disaggregation possibilities as 
between company and capital market laws. When the concern is the ability of 
sophisticated actors to choose the combination of regimes that best suits their 
preferences and the ability of regulatory policymakers to maintain a coherent and 
effective system in the face of such extended choice, it is important to bear in mind that 
the choices available include the option of decoupling company and listing regimes by 
being incorporated and listed in different jurisdictions.18  This makes the precise 
connecting factors that will trigger the application of particular rules (incorporation? 
                                               
18 For a different take on decoupling (unbundling), which looks at the extent to which the extension of 
securities law into areas of corporate governance has had the unintended side effect of eroding US market 
power in regulatory competition in the tax field: Talley, n 9 above. 
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location of central management? listing? incorporation and listing?) an important part 
of the inquiry.  
 
(B) Emigration  
 
The relocation of UK companies to Jersey via a holdco scheme of arrangement provides 
a rich source of data on market preferences with respect to desirable features of 
company law. To put this data in context, the nature and extent of this activity can be 
outlined briefly.  This section draws upon the Practical Law What’s Market database on 
reorganisations and schemes.19  
 
As at 20 December 2015, six of the companies included in the FTSE 100 Index were 
incorporated in the Channel Island of Jersey (Experian, Glencore, Randgold, Shire, 
Wolseley, WPP).20 Of these, Experian, Shire, Wolseley and WPP are companies with 
strong roots in the UK that used schemes of arrangement to relocate. Other companies 
                                               
19 http://uk.practicallaw.com/7-386-8909?source=relatedcontent. 
20 The FTSE has its own rules for determining nationality and does not necessarily follow place of 
incorporation: FTSE, Determining Nationality (September 2015), at 
http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/Determining_Nationality.pdf. Nationality for FTSE 
purposes is not rigidly tied to place of incorporation and allocation decisions are based on a range of 
factors including tax domicile, the location of headquarters, the location of shareholder meetings and the 
membership of the board of directors. 
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outside the FTSE 100 have also used schemes of arrangement to relocate from the UK to 
Jersey, including the AIM traded issuer Sarossa Capital, which relocated in 2014, and 
the LSE premium listed issuer Cape, which relocated in 2011.21 Tax considerations 
formed a common theme running through these relocations22 but it is the company law 
implications that are relevant here.  
                                               
21 Earlier examples are Velti Group (2009, Jersey (incorporation)/Ireland (tax)); Informa (2009, 
Jersey/Switzerland (but Informa relocated back to the UK in 2014); Beazley (2009, Jersey/Ireland (but 
relocated back to the UK in 2016 via a holdco scheme of arrangement); Tarsus (2008, Jersey/Ireland)); 
Regus (2008, Jersey/Luxembourg); Charter (2008, Jersey/Ireland); Henderson (Jersey/ Ireland); United 
Business Media (2008, Jersey/Ireland (but later moved tax residency back to UK). 
22 Experian resulted from a demerger in 2006 (from GUS plc to Argos and Experian) and its incorporation 
(Jersey) and tax domicile (Ireland) were deliberate choices resulting from a strategic review. Shire’s 
relocation to Jersey (with tax residence in the Republic of Ireland) was prompted by global growth and a 
desire to protect the group’s taxation position: Shire Press Release, 15 April 2008, at 
http://www.investegate.co.uk/article.aspx?id=20080415070000PC249.  Wolseley, which opted for Swiss 
tax residency, cited tax certainty in explaining its move: Wolseley Results of Court and Scheme General 
Meeting 2 November 2010, at http://www.wolseley.com/index.asp?pageid=69&newsid=11. WPP’s 
emigration in 2008 was a direct result of concerns about the then Labour government’s proposals for the 
taxation of foreign profits; the new Jersey holding company was tax resident in the Republic of Ireland 
and listed on the LSE Main Market: WPP plc Circular, 13 November 2012, 5, at  
http://www.wpp.com/wpp/investor/financialnews/2012/nov/13/wpp-plc-return-to-the-united/. In 
2012/3 WPP used a further holdco scheme of arrangement to return its headquarters and tax residence to 
the UK, whilst retaining a Jersey incorporation: ibid, 11. Cape gave as reasons for its holdco scheme that a 
review of its corporate group structure had identified the Far East and Pacific Rim as the growth areas for 
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Companies that have emigrated from the UK to Jersey have typically stressed that from 
a corporate law and governance standpoint it is intended to be very much ‘business as 
usual’; an apt illustration is provided by the statement by the Chairman of Sarossa 
Capital in the letter to shareholders recommending its holdco scheme of arrangement 
that ‘[t]here will be no substantive changes to corporate governance and investor 
protection measures’.23  There are many features of typical structures that support this 
claim. Like other foreign companies, a Jersey incorporated issuer is eligible for official 
listing in the UK and can apply for admission to the Main Market of the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) with either a premium listing (where standards exceed the harmonised 
EU level) or a standard (EU-level) listing. A new applicant for premium listing is 
expected to have a clean trading record of at least three years but the introduction of a 
new holding company to a group that already has a premium listing does not engage 
                                                                                                                                                       
its business and that it had received strong support, including tax incentives, from the government of 
Singapore and the Singapore Economic Development Board: Cape plc Circular, 9 May 2011, 11, at 
http://www.capeplc.com/media/174722/capecircular_9_5_11.pdf.  The scheme resulted in a Jersey-
incorporated company with tax residence in Singapore and Jersey.  In the case of Sarossa Capital, its 
Board cited Jersey’s efficient fiscal regime as one of the factors behind the move: Sarossa Capital plc 
Circular, 20 March, 2014, 9, at  
http://www.sarossaplc.com/archive/circulars/GM_Circular_Notice_200314.pdf. 
23 Sarossa Capital plc Circular, n 22 above, 8. 
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these requirements24 and in other cases, the historical record of the existing group may 
suffice.25 Experian, Shire, Wolseley, WPP and Cape are all premium listed. A Jersey 
issuer, in common with other foreign companies, can also seek admission to the LSE’s 
second tier market, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), and a ‘fast-track’ 
procedure is available where a new holdco is inserted in place of an existing AIM 
issuer, as in the case of Sarossa Capital.26 For the purposes of oversight of its 
prospectuses and other market disclosures, a Jersey company, as a third country issuer, 
can opt into the UK regime operated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); an 
election to have the FCA as its ‘home’ State competent authority enables a UK issuer 
that relocates to Jersey to retain EU cross-border passporting rights. All premium listed 
issuers (wherever incorporated) are now required to make their corporate governance 
disclosures by reference to the UK Corporate Governance Code.27  
 
In addition, Jersey companies enjoy some special advantages, not generally available to 
foreign companies, and which reflect close historical links between the jurisdictions. 
CREST, the UK’s securities settlement system extends to transactions in Channel Island 
                                               
24 LR 6.1.1A.  
25 LR 6.1.3D. 
26 Sarossa Capital plc Circular, n 22 above, 21.  
27 LR 9.8.6(5)-(6) and 9.8.7. 
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securities. The jurisdictional reach of the UK Takeover Code extends to offers for 
companies which have their registered offices in the Channel Islands and which are 
publicly traded on markets or trading facilities in the UK (including AIM), Channel 
Islands or Isle of Man. One pertinent difference is that a non-UK company must have a 
free float (as determined by the FTSE Ground Rules) of not less than 50 per cent to be 
considered eligible for inclusion in the FTSE UK Index Series, whereas the threshold for 
UK incorporated companies is 25 per cent.28  This may make relocation less attractive 
for company with a free float of less than 50 per cent. FTSE eligibility can also be a 
factor underlying inwards traffic to the UK from other jurisdictions.29  
 
So far as ‘core’ company law is concerned, the similarities between company law in the 
UK and Jersey, based on their common heritage, give relocating companies a head start 
in claiming that it is business as usual. However, for the purposes of examining 
relocations as a market preference-revealing mechanism, it is the differences between 
the regimes and the contractual adaptations made in response to them that matter 
more. The Companies (Jersey) Law 1991 does not contain the full range of shareholder 
                                               
28 FTSE, Ground Rules for the FTSE UK Index Series (Version 12.8, May 2016), 4.4, at 
http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_UK_Index_Series.pdf; FTSE, Determining 
Nationality, n 20 above. 
29 As in the case of Polyus Gold which in 2011 used a scheme of arrangement under Jersey law to insert a 
UK holding company as preparation for admission to premium listing.  
  FINAL SUBMISSION DRAFT 30 MAY 2016 
 
19 
 
rights and protections contained in the UK Companies Act 2006 but it has become 
standard practice for relocating companies to replicate certain UK standards by means 
of contractual provisions in articles of association. This practice of using contract to 
enshrine rights that shareholders in a UK incorporated company would normally 
expect to have can be viewed, in effect, as an endorsement from the market’s dominant 
players of the UK position on these matters. 
 
The package of special provisions included in articles of association to avoid erosion of 
shareholder protections typically includes30: pre-emption rights with respect to new 
shares (reflecting UK Companies Act 2006, section 56131); shareholder sanction for share 
allotments (reflecting UK Companies Act 2006, section 551); a three-quarters majority 
required by special resolutions (reflecting UK Companies Act 2006, section 283) rather 
than the two-thirds majority mandated by Article 90 of the Jersey companies legislation 
and related provision with respect to majorities required for the variation of class rights; 
shareholder approval of ex gratia compensation payments to directors for loss of office 
(reflecting Companies Act 2006, sections 215-221); power for companies to request 
                                               
30 This paragraph draws on corporate documents accessible via the Practical Law What’s Market database  
Reorganisations and schemes, at http://uk.practicallaw.com/7-386-8909?source=relatedcontent. 
31 An overseas company that is a premium listed issuer is required by the FCA Listing Rules (LR 9.3.11) to 
offer new shares to existing shareholders on a pre-emptive basis and must incorporate provision to that 
effect in its constitution (LR 6.1.25).  
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information about the beneficial ownership of shares (reflecting UK Companies Act 
2006, section 793); and information rights in favour of beneficial owners of shares 
(reflecting Companies Act 2006, section 146). In addition, provisions are typically 
included in articles to achieve a closer alignment with the UK position with respect to 
certain aspects of company meetings’ procedures, including the right of proxies to 
speak and vote on a show of hands (see UK Companies Act 2006, section 324) and the 
rights of shareholders to require a company to circulate resolutions and explanatory 
statements (see UK Companies Act 2006, sections 338 ff and 314). Articles of association 
typically also include requirements equivalent to the relevant provisions of the FCA 
Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR) on disclosure of interests in shares.32 The 
Jersey companies legislation does not contain an equivalent to the UK Companies Act 
2006, section 168, which empowers shareholders to remove a director from office by 
passing an ordinary resolution to that effect and which is widely regarded as one of the 
key pillars of the British corporate governance framework. However, that gap is already 
closed by standard Jersey articles33 and further bespoke provision is thus not needed 
where they are used.   
 
                                               
32 DTR 5, which applies to officially listed issuers (wherever incorporated) and to UK-incorporated AIM 
issuers.  
33 Jersey (Standard Table) (Jersey) Order 1992, Art 72.  
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The Companies (Jersey) Law 1991 is far more flexible than the UK Companies Act 2006 
in the area of corporate capital maintenance (and has been progressively relaxed34), 
including allowing distributions to be made on the basis of a solvency statement,35 more 
flexible rules governing share buybacks,36 and no ban on the giving of financial 
assistance.37 It is not usual for the articles of a relocating company to re-impose these 
restrictions contractually.38 This practice is consistent with, and further reinforces, the 
widely-held view that the UK capital maintenance regime (which gives effect to EU 
law) is outdated and cannot be justified on market-mimicking efficiency grounds. The 
urge by relocating companies to ensure ‘business as usual’ so far as company law is 
                                               
34 Most recently by the Companies (Amendments No 11) (Jersey) Law 2014. 
35 Ogier, Listing Jersey Holding Companies (November 2011), at   
http://www.ogier.com/publications/listing-jersey-holding-companies?PDF=true.  
36 Mourant Ozannes, Distributions and Share Purchases and Redemptions under the Companies (Jersey) 
Law 1991 (September 2015), at http://www.mourantozannes.com/media/1393538/distributions-and-
share-purchases-and-redemptions-under-the-companies-jersey-law-1991.pdf.  
37 Bedell Cristin, An Overview of Jersey Company Law (April 2011), at  
https://www.bedellgroup.com/siteFiles/resources/docs/insights/Briefings/Company%20and%20Com
mercial%20-%20Jersey%20Briefings/anoverviewofjerseycompanylaw.pdf.  
38 But special provision is included in typical articles to require the giving of financial assistance by a 
public company (which is not permitted by the UK Companies Act 2006) to be subject to approval by a 
special resolution of the shareholders.  
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concerned is thus shown not to be merely a mechanical exercise: an element of positive 
choice as to what is valuable (and what is not) in the legal framework of the country of 
departure is involved. It is important to note in passing that creditor claims against 
existing members of a corporate group are not disturbed by the introduction of a new 
parent company so there is no ground for intervention to protect the interests of 
creditors from a midstream change to which they did not consent. Moreover, future 
creditors of the new Jersey holdco will be on notice that they are dealing with a Jersey 
company and, therefore, within the creditor protection framework of the Jersey 
corporate regime.  
 
Whilst it is no surprise that departing companies leave the capital maintenance doctrine 
behind them, a rather more striking omission from the bespoke articles of association of 
relocating companies is a contractual equivalent to the UK shareholder ‘say on pay’ 
regime, comprising an annual advisory shareholder vote on the remuneration report  
and a binding shareholder vote at least every three years on the remuneration policy.39  
The annual reports of the FTSE 100 Jersey incorporated issuers with historic links to the 
UK indicate that, to date, they have chosen voluntarily to follow the UK regime as a 
matter of good governance.  The practice of voluntary adherence to the UK say on pay 
regime has also been adopted by some other Jersey-incorporated companies, despite the 
absence of direct historical links to the UK.  For example, Glencore’s Annual Report 
                                               
39 Companies Act 2006, ss 439-440.  
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2015 notes that ‘Although, as a Jersey registered company headquartered in 
Switzerland, Glencore is not subject to the UK’s remuneration reporting regime, we 
consider it to be broadly reflective of good practice and have prepared this report in 
compliance with it, where feasible to do so’.40  It was a Jersey-incorporated company, 
Kentz Corporation, that claimed the dubious accolade of being the first company to 
have its remuneration policy formally voted down; Kentz was a FTSE 250 company at 
the time of the vote in 2014 but it has since been taken over by the UK SNC-Lavalin 
Group. 
 
A voluntary commitment based on good practice is inherently more fragile than an 
obligation that is hardwired into corporate constitutional documents. So far, 
shareholder  dissatisfaction with pay has been sporadic but signs from the 2016 AGM 
season are that shareholders are becoming more willing to protest, especially in non-
binding votes on remuneration reports. This trend could increasingly test the resilience 
of a voluntary approach. That companies that have relocated to Jersey have left open 
the possibility to escape say on pay is a straw in the wind as to the general policy 
challenge posed by corporate mobility to which this article will return later. When such 
high-profile, and supposedly mandatory, legal requirements do not command sufficient 
                                               
40 Glencore Annual Report 2015, 89, at 
http://www.glencore.com/assets/investors/doc/reports_and_results/2015/GLEN-2015-Annual-
Report.pdf.  
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market support even for investors to insist on contractual replication as part of the 
‘price’ for their support to relocate, the essentially optional character of company law 
comes into sharp focus. This point has ramifications for EU, as well as UK, company 
law because the revised Shareholder Rights Directive is intended to put in place a 
mandatory say on pay regime for issuers incorporated in an EU Member States and 
admitted to trading on an EU regulated market that is similar to the UK model.41 
 
But before delving further into those policy challenges, the discussion must first go in a 
different direction. Thus far, the focus has been on corporate mobility from the 
standpoint of the country of departure but extended choice between systems of 
company law also has implications for arrival countries. The next part of the article 
examines recent UK experience as a country of arrival to provide a more rounded 
understanding of the issues at stake.  
 
(C) Immigration  
 
More choice between company law systems provides new business opportunities for 
the arrival country but it also has the potential to make the arrival country vulnerable to 
new forms of opportunistic conduct that are misaligned with the public interest. 
Incorporation-friendly countries such as the UK run the risk of their corporate form 
                                               
41 See n 17 above.  
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being used as the vehicle of choice for illegal activities such as money laundering, tax 
evasion or other forms of financial crime. The recently-enacted UK Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 contains a number of transparency-oriented 
measures that are aimed at protecting the UK corporate law environment from ‘shell’ 
company-related abuses of this sort.42 The Act also closes an important loophole by 
extending the directors’ disqualification regime to allow for disqualification on the basis 
of foreign convictions and for conduct in relation to overseas companies to be 
considered as part of an evaluation of unfitness.43 On the whole, the corporate aspects 
of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 are aimed at egregious 
practices that no high-quality jurisdiction would wish to condone but whether the right 
balance has been struck between (good) transparency and (bad) erosion of privacy that 
could deprive British business of legitimate investment remains to be seen.  
 
                                               
42 Relevant corporate law aspects of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 include: the 
abolition of bearer shares (ss 84-86); the establishment of new corporate registers of persons with 
significant control (ss 81-83, ‘significant’ being at thresholds of holding 25 per cent shares/voting rights, 
controlling the appointment of the majority of the board; having the right to exercise or actual exercising 
significant influence or control); prohibition on corporate directors (ss 87-88); and possible extension by 
regulation of directors’ general duties to shadow directors (ss 89-91).   
43 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1985, s 5A and s 6 (inserted/amended by Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, ss 104-106).  
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The ‘balance’ question is pervasive. Take the corporate re-organisation strategies 
considered in the previous part. There is nothing inherently illegitimate about the use of 
these legal technologies for the purposes of changing corporate national identity but 
like all advances in legal technology, there is the potential for misuse and for 
unanticipated side-effects.  Moreover, it is not only the lower tax revenues flowing into 
the public coffers that may result from corporate mobility that may be a cause for 
concern. Practices such as reverse takeovers and mergers to change corporate locations 
can generate controversy because of suspicions of use of ‘back doors’ to avoid normal 
entry standards.44 By facilitating issuer choice with respect to whether to be listed as a 
domestic-incorporated issuer or as a foreign issuer, commercial ingenuity can challenge 
policy assumptions that underpin differentiated requirements for domestic and foreign 
companies. And by making more likely the prospect of a greater number of footloose 
‘global’ companies that adopt a particular national citizenship as and when, and only 
for as long as, it suits them, these practices risk introducing alien elements into a 
corporate environment that has evolved around the needs of the ‘standard’ domestic 
company. From the UK standpoint, the threat of disruption is potentially significant 
                                               
44 A notable area of controversy from a ‘back door’ entry viewpoint has been the use of reverse mergers 
by Chinese companies to gain entry to US markets: C.M.C. Lee, K.K. Li and R. Zhang, ‘Shell Games: The 
Long Term Performance of Chinese Reverse Merger Firms’ (2015) 90 Accounting Review 1547; M.N. 
Darrough, The Spillover Effect of Fraud Allegations against Chinese Reverse Mergers (January 5, 2015, at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2545685;  SEC Investor Bulletin: Reverse Mergers (June 2011); C. Wu, Shortcut 
to the U.S. Markets through Reverse Mergers (2012) 3 Review of Business & Finance Case Studies 43. 
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because the standard features of the UK listed company ― dispersed shareholders and 
professional managers ― are not replicated in most of the rest of the world.  
 
Whilst tensions between controlling and minority shareholders can arise within ‘home 
grown’ UK-incorporated listed companies,45 the predominance of the dispersed 
shareholder model of corporate ownership has resulted in a policy focus mainly on 
manager/shareholder agency problems. The broad corporate law environment, 
including listing requirements and corporate governance standards, reflects the 
prevailing corporate ownership pattern.  However, London’s success in attracting 
foreign listings (‘foreign’ for this purpose including businesses that restructure to 
acquire a UK holdco but which are, in substance, essentially foreign-based) has brought 
with it more exposure to majority/minority shareholder agency problems.46  Other 
                                               
45 Sports Direct International plc is a pertinent example.  During 2016 Sports Direct, which has a majority 
shareholder (Mike Ashley) owning over 50 per cent of its shares, had its valuation cut because of 
governance concerns, saw revolts from independent (but minority) shareholders  over directors’ pay and 
was beset by allegations that its pay practices breached the minimum wage legislation: S. Goodley and J. 
Ashby, ‘Revealed: How Sports Direct Effectively Pays Below Minimum Wage’ The Guardian, 9 December 
2015 (online).  
46 R. Barker, Bumi or Bust – The Corporate Governance Implications of Foreign Issuers in London (London: IoD 
Big Picture, Summer 2013);  R. Barker and I.H.Y. Chiu, ‘Protecting Minority Shareholders in Blockholder-
controlled Companies: Evaluating the UK’s Enhanced Listing Regime in Comparison with Investor 
Protection Regimes in New York and Hong Kong’ (2015) 10 Capital Markets Law Journal 98.  
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jurisdictions have had their own similar encounters with the downside of extended 
corporate mobility facilitated by commercial ingenuity.47  
  
Here it can suffice briefly to review two particularly notorious cases that revealed 
shortcomings in the operation of the established UK approach.48 The first involved 
ENRC, an essentially Kazakhstan-based business that conducted a group re-
organisation in 2006 to insert a UK holdco and simplify the ownership structure of the 
group’s assets. Thereafter, ENRC plc floated on the London Stock Exchange in 2007 and 
became a member of the FTSE 100 in March 2008. ENRC delisted in December 2013 
after its shareholders supported a bid by its founders and the Kazakhstan government 
to take the company private. ENRC’s listing was a turbulent episode. As a company 
with a small number of controlling shareholders (three founder ‘oligarch’ shareholders, 
                                               
47 eg, D.W. Puchniak and L.L. Lan, Independent Directors in Singapore: Puzzling Compliance Requiring 
Explanation (July 14, 2015). NUS Law Working Paper No. 2015/006, at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2604067  discussing the meteoric rise of S-Chips (companies that listed on the 
Singapore Exchange but whose operations and controlling shareholders were located in mainland China) 
and their propensity to collapse.  The authors note that S-Chips scandals exposed weaknesses in 
Singapore’s established system of regulation and spurred reform.  
48 Barker and Chiu, n 46 above , also discuss the 2014 take-private of Essar Energy, a Mumbai-based 
conglomerate that listed in London with controlling shareholders. Whilst Essar also faced questions about 
its internal corporate governance, its troubles owed much to difficult trading and political conditions and, 
in that sense, it is distinguishable from the cases discussed in the text. 
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another Kazakh mining company and the Kazakh government) ENRC was very 
different from the standard UK plc. It was allowed it to list with a ‘free float’ (shares in 
public hands) of less than the 25 per cent usually required because the overall size of the 
offering was so large. The UK Corporate Governance Code applied to ENRC as a 
premium listed company but the role envisaged by the Code for independent directors 
(which includes independence from controlling shareholders49) never operated well. 
Tensions between the independent members of the board and the controlling 
shareholders were rife.50  In the assessment of one of its former independent directors, 
there had been a ‘chronic failure to meet the governance expected of a FTSE 100 
company’.51 In 2013 the UK Serious Fraud Office announced that ENRC was under 
investigation for allegations of fraud, bribery and corruption. When the company was 
taken private, the bid was at a price that its then independent directors felt materially 
                                               
49 Corporate Governance Code, B.1.1. 
50 One independent director voted off the board was later quoted as saying that the company should 
never have been allowed to float in London: R. Mason and J. Quinn, ‘Sir Richard Sykes: ENRC’s Walk 
Into the Line of Fire’, The Telegraph, 11 June 2011 (online). Another ousted independent director described 
the company as ‘more Soviet than City’: G. White, R. Mason and A. Andrews, ‘ENRC “More Soviet than 
City”, says ousted board member Ken Olisa’, The Telegraph, 9 June 2011 (online). Another former 
independent director stands accused by the company of leaking confidential information and litigation is 
ongoing at the time of writing: Eurasian Natural Resources Corpn Ltd v Sir Paul Judge [2014] EWHC 3556 
(QBD) (interim hearing). 
51 White, Mason and Andrews, n 50 above, quoting Ken Olisa.  
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undervalued the business but which they nevertheless recommended the shareholders 
to consider it seriously because there was a lack of alternative options and imminent 
delisting could adversely affect liquidity, marketability and value.  
 
The second case of ARMS/Bumi/Vallar was equally out of the ordinary. Vallar plc, an 
investment vehicle led by Nathaniel Rothschild, was formed in 2010 as a Jersey 
company and on its IPO was admitted to the standard listed segment of the London 
Stock Exchange as a cash ‘shell’. The ‘standard’ segment of the market is intended to 
provide a ‘directive minimum’ (i.e. it reflects minimum standards required by EU 
directives) listing venue that is clearly differentiated from the enhanced standards 
‘premium’ segment, and also sufficiently flexible to cater for a wide range of issuers 
(UK and foreign) and investors.52  Standard listed issuers are required to make an 
annual corporate governance ‘comply or explain’ statement by reference to the 
corporate governance code to which they are subject and/or the code which the issuer 
has voluntarily chosen to apply.53 Jersey does not have its own corporate governance 
code and Vallar chose to report by reference to the UK Code.  
 
                                               
52 Financial Services Authority, A Review of the Structure of the Listing Regime (DP08/1); Financial 
Services Authority, Listing Regime Review (CP09/24); Financial Services Authority, Policy Statement on 
the Listing Regime Review (PS10/2). 
53 DTR 7.2. 
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Between 2010 and 2011 Vallar acquired a number of Indonesia-based natural resource 
companies, in effect enabling those businesses to secure a London listing via a reverse 
takeover. As a result of these acquisitions, the Indonesia-based Bakrie group acquired a 
47 per cent stake in the London-listed company.54 In 2011, the group was re-organised 
by means of a scheme of arrangement that inserted a new UK incorporated holdco 
(Bumi plc). Bumi then joined the London Stock Exchange with a premium listing and 
became the first Indonesia-focused company to enter the FTSE 100. As a UK-
incorporated company, the applicable FTSE eligibility requirement with respect to 
minimum free float was 25 per cent as opposed to the 50 per cent required of foreign 
companies.  
 
During 2012 evidence of financial irregularities and allegations of value-eroding related 
party transactions in favour of Bakrie companies began to emerge.55 There followed a 
period of intense clashes between Rothschild and the Bakries.56  An acrimonious 
settlement in December 2013 saw the division of the group, the buy out of the Bakrie 
stake by another Indonesian investor, and a change of name of the remaining entity to 
Asia Resource Minerals plc (ARMS).  However, in the face of falling coal prices, ARMS 
did not prosper and in 2015, after more acrimony, it was eventually taken over by Asia 
                                               
54 Barker, n 46 above.   
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid. 
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Coal Ventures, a British Virgin Islands vehicle company managed by a Hong Kong 
based special situations hedge fund manager and funded by the corporate group of 
another wealthy Indonesian family. In addition, the company continued to be haunted 
by the events of the Bakrie period: in 2015 ARMS announced that it had reached a 
settlement with the FCA with regard to an investigation concerning certain related 
party transactions.57 The penalty of £4.56 million58 related to three related party 
transactions between companies within the group and entities connected to Rosan 
Roeslani, a former director with links to the Bakrie family. Efforts to enforce a Singapore 
arbitration award obtained against Roeslani for payment of $173 million continued.59 
 
The sagas of ENRC and Vallar/Bumi/ARMS showed in graphic terms the negative side 
of the controlling shareholder ownership model: the potential weakness of independent 
directors vis-à-vis powerful concentrated ownership blocs, and the risk of related party 
                                               
57 ARMS Press Release, Financial Conduct Authority Investigation – Settlement Press Release, 17 June 
2015, at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/news/market-news/market-news-
detail/ARMS/12392568.html. 
58 FCA, Final notice: Asia Resource Minerals plc (formerly Bumi plc), 12 June 2105, at  
https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/asia-resource-minerals.pdf. 
59 ARMS Press Release, Result of Arbitration, 31 December 2014; ARMS Press Release, Update on 
Enforcement of Arbitration Award, 14 January 2015, at  
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/news/market-news/market-news-
detail/ARMS/12213779.html. 
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transactions that extract value from the business to the detriment of minority 
shareholders. Perhaps mindful of the old saying that ‘hard cases make bad law’, in a 
review of the listing regime the then regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
warned against treating specific concerns as representing a systemic problem.60  
Nevertheless, it felt that change was needed to strengthen the position of minority 
shareholders – in effect, an evaluation that the ‘comply or explain’ corporate 
governance principle was not always sufficient to protect shareholders and that more 
prescriptive rules were needed.61  
 
The UK listing regime was the vehicle for change, effective from May 2014. The key 
changes related to the listing requirements for premium listed companies with a 
controlling shareholder (‘control’ here being at the 30 per cent level).62 Under the 
revised listing regime a premium listed issuer, wherever incorporated, must be able to 
demonstrate that it carries on an independent business;63  it must have in place a formal 
relationship agreement with its controlling shareholder(s) and must comply with its 
                                               
60 FSA, Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Listing Regime (CP12/25) para 1.24.  Later follow up: FCA, 
Feedback on CP12/25: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Listing Regime and Further Consultation 
(CP13/15).  
61 FSA, CP12/25, n 60 above, para 1.26 and para 7.30. 
62 LR 6.1.2A. 
63 LR 6.1.4; LR 9.2.2A(1). 
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independence provisions at all times.64 The relationship agreement must impose 
obligations on the controlling shareholder to ensure that transactions with the company 
are at arms length and on normal commercial terms; and to undertake not to cause the 
listed company to breach or circumvent the listing rules.65  Given that companies 
dominated by a controlling shareholder are unlikely to take private enforcement action, 
the key sanction for breach of the relationship agreement is that all transactions with the 
controlling shareholder will become subject to prior independent shareholder approval, 
regardless of the size of the transaction.66  
 
The position of independent directors of premium listed companies was also reinforced. 
The premium listing regime now requires that where there is a controlling shareholder, 
the election or re-election of independent directors must be approved by a simple 
majority of shareholders as a whole, and also by a simple majority of independent 
shareholders.67 However, if independent shareholders fail to elect or re-elect an 
independent director, the controlling shareholder can put to matter to a vote at a 
subsequent general meeting at which there is no requirement for a separate 
                                               
64 LR 6.1.4B; LR 9.2.2A(2); LR 9.2.2G. 
65 LR 6.1.4D. 
66 LR 11.1.1A.  
67 LR 9.2.2E. 
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independent shareholder vote.68 So, independent shareholders can delay but not 
ultimately block the appointment of an ‘independent’ director. Furthermore, 
independent shareholders may be able to do little to protect a director who seeks to act 
in a truly independent way and, in so doing, displeases a controlling shareholder: the 
ability for a simple majority of shareholders to remove a director from office is 
protected by statute69 and is a prized part of the corporate law environment viewed 
from the classic UK corporate agency problem in which shareholder protection vis-à-vis 
management is key.  
 
Other controlling shareholder-related changes to the listing regime that were 
introduced included enhanced minority protections on cancellation of listings70 or on 
transfers between listing categories,71 and new disclosure requirements.72 Requirements 
relating to reverse takeovers73 and to sponsors were also strengthened.74 Premium 
                                               
68 LR 9.2.2F. 
69 Companies Act 2006, s 168. 
70 LR 5.2.5. 
71 LR 5.4A.4. 
72 LR 9.8.4-9.8.4A 
73 LR 5.6. 
74 LR 8.  
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listing principles were revised to mandate equal voting within classes of shares and 
broad proportionality of voting to equity as between classes of shares.75  A new rule 
limiting eligibility to vote on matters required by the Listing Rules because the 
company is premium listed to holders of premium listed shares was adopted.76 
However, the option of increasing the minimum free float requirement as a strategy to 
counteract controlling shareholders was not pursued:77 the FCA, as successor to the 
FSA, accepted that to do so ‘could impose disproportionate burdens on all companies, 
when … the vast majority of companies (including premium listed companies with 
controlling shareholders) are governed well. We were also warned of the risk of turning 
minority protection into minority control’.78 
 
                                               
75 Premium Listing Principles 3 and 4.  
76 LR 9.2.21. 
77 LR 6.1.19 (premium listing) and LR 14.2.2 (standard listing).  The meaning of  shares ‘not held in public 
hands’ was tightened (LR 6.1.19(4)/LR 14.2.2(4)) and further clarification was added to the premium 
listing regime on the circumstances in which the FCA would accept a percentage of less than 25 per cent 
in public hands (LR 6.1.20A). 
78 FCA, CP13/15, n 60 above, para 1.5. Also more detailed discussion in FCA, CP13/15, ch 8, where the 
FCA confirmed that at the premium level the more that the free float fell  below 25 per cent, the weightier 
the evidence it would expect to have to be comfortable in granting a derogation, and also that there 
would be greater flexibility in the standard segment to cater for a wider range of issuers and securities. 
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The FCA’s comment provides the lead into the final substantive part of this article. This 
part has demonstrated the force of global corporate mobility as a driver of a reinforced 
legal and regulatory framework: in a nutshell, changes in the corporate population 
drew attention to weaknesses in the protection of outside shareholders that had 
previously been less of a worry because of the predominant ownership model;  the need 
for reforms to improve outside shareholder protection became manifest. But the 
changes have not attracted universal praise. Critics of the independent business and 
relationship agreement requirements that were introduced into the UK listing regime in 
response to the corporate scandals described in this part have argued that from the 
point of view of encouraging engagement, these reforms are ‘arguably a regressive and 
thus lamentable development’.79  Underpinning this argument is an important point: 
the arrival of an ‘alien species’ may, on occasion, import harmful behaviours but 
corporate immigration, in itself, is not an adverse development that requires defensive 
action; indeed, such action, if insufficiently finely-tuned, could in itself have harmful 
effects.  Different ownership models enhance the diversity of the corporate population 
and a particular strength of the insider, controlling shareholder model is the stronger 
incentive to monitor management that goes with concentrated ownership.80  From that 
                                               
79 M.T. Moore and E. Walker-Arnott, ‘A Fresh Look at Stock Market Short-termism’ (2014) 41 Journal of 
Law and Society 416, 444. 
80 R.J. Gilson, ‘Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative 
Taxonomy’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1641; M. Gelter, ‘Risk-shifting through Issuer Liability and 
Corporate Monitoring (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 498, 511-515. 
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standpoint, the immigration of companies that embody the positive attributes of the 
concentrated ownership model begins to look rather attractive and reforms that would 
cause them to shun the UK take on the appearance of a policy misstep. 
 
So what reforms to cope with both emigration and immigration?  And how far should 
such reforms go? Law reform is not a mechanistic exercise: it involves choice on the part 
of lawmakers, with respect to both substantive content and the appropriate regulatory 
instrument  to ensure that the desired segments of the corporate population (eg, 
domestically incorporated? domestically incorporated and listed?; listed (wherever 
incorporated)?) are within scope. Opportunities for sophisticated actors to engage in 
regulatory arbitrage between company law (in a narrow sense) and capital markets law 
need to be anticipated and addressed. Corporate law reforms are invariably couched in 
the rhetoric of maintaining global competitiveness as a business-friendly location. But 
fine judgments, guided by principle and informed by evidence, are needed to translate 
broad ideas into concrete policy that both hits the target and avoids going too far.  
 
(D) Policy implications of extended choice between systems of company law  
 
The growing range of transactional structures that enable private parties to choose 
between systems of company law discussed in the previous parts adds a new dimension 
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to questions about the public policy challenges involved in shaping company law to 
promote business success for society’s benefit. This is particularly so for legal systems 
outside the United States, where corporate mobility is a relatively new concept and 
where the focus, historically, has mostly been on degrees of flexibility within domestic 
law. Here the focus is the UK. 
 
First there is the question of the policy stance with respect to the control of emigration 
itself. Whilst corporate ‘desertion’ can attract criticism because of its associations with 
tax mitigation strategies, from the company law angle, for the state to seek to stand in 
the way of properly-managed exits would be highly problematic. Proper management 
in this context implies a framework that caters properly for mid-stream changes that 
were not an implicit part of the investment bargain. Such safeguards ― found in all the 
main procedures used to effect migration from the UK (schemes of arrangement, 
takeovers, cross-border mergers and conversion into an SE)  ―  can be explained fairly 
easily in terms of the hypothetical bargain of rational actors since they encourage 
investment by providing ex ante protection against exploitation by managers or 
controllers.81 However, there is no convincing company law public policy justification 
for more extensive intervention, either at national or EU level. (It is necessary to bring in 
the EU dimension here because under EU law the UK could not, in any event, 
                                               
81 L.A. Bebchuk, ‘Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter 
Amendments’ (1989) Harvard Law Review 1820.  
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unilaterally prevent a UK company from converting itself into a form of company 
governed by the law of another Member State to which it moves.82)  
  
Cross-border mobility is a strategy for businesses to manage their operational and 
organisational costs. As such, it is something that at a fundamental level company law 
policy should seek to facilitate rather than restrain. Freedom to move across borders 
within the community goes to the heart of the EU’s market integration objective.83 The 
freedom for market actors to use the corporate form as a risk allocation and 
management tool is also deeply embedded in UK law and policy thinking. Neither 
statute nor caselaw has evinced much willingness to interfere with business decisions 
regarding the use of the corporate form except in extreme cases involving the evasion of 
                                               
82 Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt [2008] ECR I-9641, para 112. 
83 Case C-411/03 Sevic Systems AG [2005] I-10805 [19]. This is not to ignore unease about the use of so-
called ‘letterbox’ companies within the EU: K.E. Sørensen, 'The Fight Against Letterbox Companies in the 
Internal Market' (2015) 52 CML Rev 85. However, Sørensen notes that apart from the requirement for SEs 
to have their registered office and head office in the same MS: (Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 
8 October 2001on the Statute for a European company (SE) [2001] OJ L294/1, Art 7), general EU company 
law does not impinge materially on choices between systems and the problems associated with 
letterboxes are instead addressed via targeted interventions (such as anti-money laundering  measures  
and the tax treatment of intra-group transactions) and regulation in specific areas of business (such as 
banking, where, as with SEs, head and registered offices must be in the same MS). The targeted approach 
is consistent with the view preferred in this text.  
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existing obligations.84  For this freedom to embrace decisions about where to locate or 
relocate is simply a logical progression. Whilst ingenious mobility-facilitating structures 
that achieve commercial purposes in a tax-efficient manner may involve a certain 
amount of artificiality, from a corporate law standpoint that, in itself, is no reason not to 
sanction them.85 The stress on facilitation implies a risk that contractual or voluntary 
protections negotiated by stakeholders at the time of exit could prove to be weak in the 
face of other pressures that encourage a gradual transition towards the arrival state’s 
system of corporate governance but that is a business and investment risk that 
commercial parties should be left to take for themselves.86  
 
Secondly, corporate mobility also has policy implications beyond the specific area of 
emigration controls. The ramifications are multi-directional. We saw earlier that the rise 
of corporate mobility presents new headaches for policymakers to the extent that it 
                                               
84 Prest v Petrodel [2013] 2 AC 415, [2013] UKSC 34. 
85 Re TSB Nuclear Energy Investment UK Ltd [2014] EWHC 1272 (Ch) [18]. How far the court has discretion 
on the merits of the merger is uncertain: compare Re Diamond Resorts (Europe) Ltd [2012] EWHC 3576 (Ch) 
[5] with Re Livanova plc [2015] EWHC 2865 (Ch) [14].   
86 Jennifer Hill’s study of News Corporation’s migration from Australia to Delaware has demonstrated 
that pro-shareholder concessions made at the time of reincorporation, including concessions formally 
incorporated into bespoke articles, can be rather quickly undermined: J. Hill, ‘Subverting Shareholder 
Rights: Lessons from News Corp.'s Migration to Delaware’ (2010) Vanderbilt Law Review 1.   
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involves the arrival of new forms of harm, but it is not all gloom.  One positive is that 
extended corporate mobility has the capacity to improve public policy by enabling its 
makers to be better-informed about both strengths and weaknesses within the existing 
framework. Regulatory competition theories allow for the characterisation of corporate 
mobility as a type of discovery mechanism that helps to reveal the particular mix of 
permissive and mandatory corporate rules that aligns best with the preferences of 
potential users.  Findings from this discovery mechanism should improve the evidence 
base for policy and be a safeguard against policy error. To be clear, choices to (re)locate 
a company in one jurisdiction rather than another will often be driven by factors that 
have little to do with the contrasting features of the relevant corporate law systems. For 
example, it was the impact of financial regulation and bank levies, not company law, 
that drove the UK-based HSBC in 2015 to announce the launch of a strategic review of 
the best place to locate its headquarters; and it is political uncertainty rather than law 
that has prompted several global companies with a UK base to say that they would 
reconsider their position in the event of a UK exit from the EU after the referendum in 
June 2016. The constellation of background considerations that will inevitably lie behind 
corporate location or relocation decisions makes it hard to interpret such choices simply 
as an expression of market sentiments with respect to company law. Yet the task of 
pinpointing market preferences is simplified where relocation in the form of a change to 
corporate nationality is accompanied by the practice of cherry-picking certain features 
of the company law system of the country of departure and taking them along, through 
contract, to the country of arrival. Hence the significance of the bespoke articles adopted 
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by UK companies that have relocated to Jersey, discussed earlier.  As has been seen, the 
data largely support the shareholder orientation of company law in the UK and suggest 
that policy assumptions about mandatory shareholder rights being the key to long term, 
sustainable business success are well-aligned with market sentiments.    
 
However, this finding also points towards a conundrum.  The market ― that is, its 
dominant actors ― may indeed like the strong shareholder orientation of UK company 
law and support further strengthening but it has become highly contestable whether the 
overarching public policy objective that underpins company law ― to help create an 
environment in which business can flourish for the benefit of society as a whole87 ― is 
best served by corporate law models that are strongly shareholder-centric in their 
orientation.88  Revealed market preferences provide empirical content for policy 
decisions but irrespective of whether policy actors use the hypothetical bargaining 
model or regulatory paternalism as their guiding principle, the job is not simply about 
                                               
87 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 439, 441. But note W.W. Bratton and M.L. Wachter, ‘Shareholders and Social Welfare’ (2013) 36 
Seattle University Law Review 489 who challenge the conventional linkage in the legal literature between 
shareholder value maximisation and social welfare maximisation. 
88 Bratton and Wachter, n 87 above, contend (at 525-526) that ‘Shareholder value enhancement certainly 
impacts economic efficiency. But …any connection between corporate politics and social welfare 
enhancement is at best tenuous and at worse regressive’.  Contrast L.A. Bebchuk, ‘The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 833.  
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codifying market practice.89 Market endorsement notwithstanding, there is a danger 
that reforms aimed at strengthening shareholder rights could actually be 
counterproductive in terms of overall social welfare in that they could simply add to the 
armoury of activists that put pressure on managers to pursue policies that produce 
short term gains but which are value destroying in the longer term.90  
 
Whilst criticism of shareholder primacy and shareholder power is not new and has 
generated an enormous body of literature, concerns have mounted in the face of a rising 
proportion of company profits being paid out to shareholders notwithstanding sluggish 
economic conditions and social tensions flowing from austerity policies.91 There is 
concern around the world about the tension between the short term profit horizons of 
modern equity investors and the long term investment that is required for sustainable 
                                               
89 M.T. Moore, ‘Private Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of Corporate 
Contractarianism’ (2014) 34 OJLS 693, 727-8. 
 
90 W.W Bratton and M.L. Wachter, ‘The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment’ (2010) 158 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 653. 
91 eg the Chief Economist of the Bank of England, Andy Haldane, has drawn attention to the fact that in 
the 1970s only 10 per cent of company profits were returned to shareholders but that this figure is now 
60-70 per cent: quoted in K. Rawlinson, ‘Shareholders Receive Too Much Money from Business- Bank’s 
Chief Economist’  The Guardian, 25 July 2015 (online).  
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economic growth.92 Negative depictions of shareholder power abound.93 For the UK, 
which has a system of company law that arguably outstrips even the US in the extent of 
its pro-shareholder orientation,94 the concerns are significant. The ‘welfare revolution’ 
signalled in 2015 by the recently-elected Conservative government threatens a 
fundamental re-evaluation of the social contract that, it is claimed, provided the 
conditions in which shareholder primacy could thrive without too much of a backlash 
from other quarters.95   
                                               
92 S.J. Terry, ‘The Macro Impact of Short-Termism’ (2015), at http://economics.mit.edu/files/10386; L. 
Stout, 'New Thinking on Shareholder Primacy' (2012) 2 Accounting, Economics and Law 2152 (claiming that 
shareholder primacy thinking in its conventional form is on the brink of intellectual collapse); J.C. Coffee 
and D. Palia, ‘The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance’ 
(2016) 1 Annals of Corporate Governance 1 (hedge fund activism may be leading to a broad and systemic 
shift by American corporations from investment to payout and in particular towards avoidance of 
investments in R&D). 
93 J.G. Hill, ‘Images of the Shareholder – Shareholder Power and Shareholder Powerlessness’ in J.G. Hill 
and R.S. Thomas (eds) Research Handbook on Shareholder Power (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2015). 
94 C.M. Bruner, ‘Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corporation’ (2010) 50 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 579.   
95 The ascendancy of shareholder primacy in the US has been linked to changes in the pension system, 
specifically the rise of defined contribution schemes that have made more of the workforce dependent on 
stock market performance: M. Gelter, ‘The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy’ (2013) 43 
Seton Hall Law Review 909. The strength of the link between pensions and the position of shareholder 
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The rise of corporate mobility intersects with the debate about the social purpose of 
companies and the excesses of shareholder power at a particularly sensitive point. 
Generally speaking lawmakers do show considerable robustness in the face of 
opposition to reform, including opposition that is linked to relocation threats. 
Aspirations for ‘modern law that provides maximum freedom for participants to 
perform their proper functions’,96  and an emphasis ‘in favour of facilitating markets’ 
and ‘against interventionist legislation’,97 do not translate into a laissez-faire approach of 
extreme deregulation. Public policy reflects a strong conviction that safeguards are 
perfectly compatible with, and necessary for, the achievement of, the goal of making a 
jurisdiction a globally attractive place to set up and run a business, the reasoning being 
that this approach will both attract issuers that want to bond with a high-quality regime 
and give investors the confidence they need in order to be persuaded to part with their 
money. Nevertheless, the rise of corporate mobility reinforces the need for 
policymakers to proceed with caution. Within the policy process, due weight must be 
                                                                                                                                                       
primacy, with implications for the location of political support for its further enhancement, is relevant to 
the UK where the pension system has shifted decisively away from defined benefit (final salary) to 
defined contribution schemes.   
96 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic 
Framework (1999), v (executive summary). 
97 Ibid. 
  FINAL SUBMISSION DRAFT 30 MAY 2016 
 
47 
 
given to the consideration that, in the end, sophisticated actors have the option to 
neutralise reforms through strategic moves to other, more amenable, jurisdictions. For 
such actors, company law is indeed anchored in the world of supply and demand and is 
essentially contractual in character.98 It follows that it will be the less sophisticated (or, 
more bluntly, less well-resourced) actors that will bear the brunt of changes that, in the 
long run, could turn out to be policy mistakes.  
 
Starting from the premise that for better or worse, the UK system of company law is 
shareholder-centric and that this orientation is unlikely to change any time soon, is 
there any scope for proposals that have the aim of curbing the negative externalities of 
shareholder short-termism to gain traction in a world of extended choice? Can we 
extract anything from the study of corporate emigrations and immigrations in this 
article to help address this question?  This may depend on how the strategic policy 
choices are framed. If they are focused narrowly on the scope to impose regulatory 
requirements to rein in shareholders, corporate mobility looks like a problem and not a 
solution because sophisticated actors have the option to find ingenious ways round 
imposed requirements. Yet the issues do not need to be so narrowly circumscribed.  
Another potentially promising strategy is to recall the essentially facilitative character of 
company law, and to reaffirm its centrality to policy development: more choice within 
company law could also make a valuable difference. To explain what may appear to be 
                                               
98 Compare Moore, n 89 above, 708-710. 
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a jarring and even heretical suggestion, let’s recall from earlier that whilst immigration 
can bring new problems, it also has the potential to foster beneficial diversity.  The 
necessarily complex trade-offs involved in the policy response to corporate mobility 
(both inwards and outwards) should therefore include thinking hard about how the UK 
can adapt its laws to increase its attractiveness as a location for companies that embody 
the best features of a plurality of ownership models because this is an exercise that, in 
time, could help to change the corporate ecosystem for the benefit of society as a whole.  
 
That the UK ecosystem needs to change derives powerful support from The Purposeful 
Company, a report in May 2016 by the Big Innovation Centre, an organisation of leaders 
from the worlds of business, politics and academia that seeks to develop practical policy 
proposals around values of purpose and inclusivity to rebalance and grow the 
economy.99 The report identifies ‘purpose’ as being key to corporate and economic 
success. It notes that ‘The British ecosystem militates against purposeful companies 
with its uniquely fragmented, diversified shareholder base, a particular legal and 
regulatory system that imposes short term profit maximisation on company boards, and 
too few forces that counteract these tendencies’.100 It calls for redesign around four 
elements pivotal to the delivery of corporate purpose: ownership, governance, the 
                                               
99 
http://www.biginnovationcentre.com/media/uploads/pdf/The%20Purposeful%20Company%20Interi
m%20Report.pdf 
100 Ibid, 4. 
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ecosystem in which firms operate and the business model the company chooses to 
operate.  This article has gone on a global trip to arrive at a similar position. Policy 
options outlined in that report overlap to an extent with two specific examples that can 
be explored briefly here to make the pro-choice hypothesis more concrete.  
 
First, take the idea of countering short-termism and rewarding long term shareholding 
through the conferral of additional voting rights (loyalty shares) or, at a more general 
level, the use of dual class or other control-enhancing ownership structures. UK 
company law is permissive with regard to departures from the proportionality 
principle.101 Furthermore, there is optionality within the listing regime in that 
companies with complex ownership structures have the choice to apply for standard 
listing with their existing control-enhancing devices or to restructure to meet the 
shareholder equal voting, proportionality and equal treatment requirements for 
premium listing.102 But the exclusion of companies with complex ownership structures 
from the more prestigious premium segment is symptomatic of a continuing significant 
                                               
101 M. Moore and P. Gillyon, ‘”Loyalty Shares” and Weighted Voting Rights in Companies Formed and 
Registered Under the Companies Acts’ [2015] Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial 
Law 334. 
102 LR 7.2.1A; Premium Listing Principles 3-5. 
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degree of distaste for departures from one-share-one-vote within UK policy circles.103 
This stance, reinforced by the post Bumi/Vallar changes to the UK listing regime,104 
reflects assumptions about the innate superiority of shareholder proportionality that in 
principle are now open to question.  Complex ownership structures are prone to certain 
types of agency concerns, it is true,105 but the shareholder engagement debate 
demonstrates that the one-share-one-vote norm is hardly problem free either. Studies 
on the value-enhancing effects of dual class or other controlling-enhancing structures 
                                               
103 BIS, Practical and Legal Issues Related to Limiting the Rights of Short-term Shareholders Suring 
Takeover Bids (BIS Roundtable, October 2014, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/367140/bis-14-
1159-note-of-bis-roundtable-issues-related-to-limiting-the-rights-of-short-term-shareholders-during-
takeover-bids.pdf) para 11 (noting that UK company law is sufficiently flexible to permit loyalty based 
ownerships structures to reward long term shareholding, should companies and their shareholders wish 
to introduce them, but that there is little demand for, and indeed significant opposition to ,such 
approaches from both companies and investors, at least with respect to publicly traded company 
equities).  
104 By, in particular, the introduction of the Premium Listing Principles and LR 9.2.21, which limits 
eligibility to vote on matters relevant to premium listing to holders of shares admitted to premium listing. 
The FCA explained that the purpose was to ‘dis-incentivise the creation of artificial structures involving 
multiple classes with different voting powers designed to allow control to rest with a small group of 
shareholders’:  CP13/15, n 60 above, para 2.25.  
105 R. Masulis, C. Wang and F. Xie, ‘Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies’ (2009) 4 Journal of Finance 
1697. 
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can be found.106 As Ventoruzzo has noted with particular reference to Italy, old taboos 
around multiple voting shares are disappearing – pertinently under exactly the sort of 
competitive pressures discussed in this article, with the ability to create loyalty share 
structures having been a key driver of the Fiat migrations to the Netherlands.107  The 
UK could go further in this regard ― not to force companies into control enhancement 
structures (the example of the controversial French Florange law serves a salutary 
example in that respect108) ― but to be even more accommodating of choice at the 
company level.109 As well as potentially rethinking the Premium Listing Principles, this 
re-adjustment could mean looking again at shareholder voting entitlements. Loyalty 
                                               
106 Barker and Chiu, n 46 above, provide an overview.  
107 M. Ventoruzzo, The Disappearing Taboo of Multiple Voting Shares: Regulatory Responses to the 
Migration of Chrysler-Fiat (March 5, 2015). Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2574236; Penn State 
Law Research Paper No. 3-2015; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 288/2015, at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2574236.  J. Delvoie and C. Clottens, ‘Accountability and Short-termism: Some 
Notes on Loyalty Shares’ (2015) 9 Law and Financial Markets Review 19. 
108 The Florange Law, introduced in 2014, automatically grants double voting rights from 2016 to shares 
registered for more than two years. There is an opt out but the high threshold (a two-thirds vote) gives it 
a very strong default character.   
109 Delvoie and Clottens, n 107 above, 24 (supporting the idea of letting companies experiment with 
loyalty shares).  See also L.L. Dallas and J.M. Barry, ‘Long-term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting’  
(2015) 40 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (forthcoming). 
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share structures can involve the use of a class of shares that is not itself listed110 but 
under the revised premium listing regime eligibility to vote on matters relevant to 
premium listing is limited to holdings of premium listed shares.111  
 
Or, secondly, to go to the very heart of company law, take the issue of the perverse 
consequences that some have associated with the much debated duty to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members (Companies Act 2006, section 172) 
― ie that contrary to what was intended, it may have actually reinforced in practice a 
short-term shareholder value maximisation version of shareholder primacy that is 
detrimental to society.112   The Kay Review of UK equity markets and long-term 
decision making reported that even though section 172 could not, in its view, be 
equated with a responsibility to maximise the current share price ‘we received evidence 
that some company directors thought that it could’.113  The post-financial crisis debate 
                                               
110P. Bolton and F. Samama, L-Shares: Rewarding Long-Term Investors (November 1, 2012). ECGI - 
Finance Working Paper No. 342/2013, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2188661. 
111 LR 9.2.21. 
112 D. Collison, S. Cross, J. Ferguson, D. Power and L. Stevenson, Shareholder Primacy in UK Corporate Law: 
An Exploration of the Rationale and Evidence (London: Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, 
2011) 34.   
 
113  J. Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-tern Decision Making: Final Report  (London: BIS, 
July 2012) 17. 
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around the need to revisit the duties of directors of banks revealed considerable 
scepticism about section 172 as an effective mechanism to curb the incentives for 
directors to pursue leveraged short-term strategies for the benefit of shareholders at the 
expense of society.114 Although some evidence of section 172 as a driver of change has 
been found,115 the assessment in recent academic literature has been rather negative as 
to the overall impact of the much-vaunted ‘enlightened shareholder value’ concept as 
something significantly different from the classic shareholder value approach.116  The 
Big Innovation Centre’s Purposeful Company Report  is also sceptical as to its practical 
impact.117  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
114 eg, Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, Changing Banking For Good (HL Paper 27-II, HC 
175-II) paras 173-175. 
 
115 A. Keay and R. Adamopoulou, ‘Shareholder Value and UK Companies: A Positivist Inquiry’ (2012) 13 
European Business Organization Law Review 1.  
116 N. Grant, ‘Mandating Corporate Environmental Responsibility by Creating a New Directors’ Duty’ 
(2015) 17 Environmental Law Review 252, 256 (‘far from implementing an enlightened approach to the role 
of the corporation, the post-2006 company law regime has, in fact, simply reverted to shareholder 
primacy in its most basic form’); N Grier, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value: Did Directors Deliver?’ (2014) 
2 Juridical Review 95 (describing s 172 as a failure and analogising it to ‘like patting a wolf on the head and 
asking it to be good’ (at p 108).  
 
117 n 99, 125. 
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More flexibility within company law could, again, hold promise as a way forward. 
When what became section 172 was first proposed, the thinking was that it was 
important to make the success duty expressly subject to the company’s constitution, the 
reasoning behind that being ‘it should be possible for the constitution of the company to 
limit and define the way in which this duty is to be carried out ... It is for the 
constitution, and decisions under it, to lay down as appropriate the success-model of 
the company and the members will be bound by this’.118 Section 172(2) expresses in a 
weak way the possibility to adapt the duty to reflect corporate purpose. Perhaps it is 
time to return to the matter and to consider making it clearer that companies do have 
the option to determine their own success model and that doing so will shape the 
operation of section 172? If nothing else, this would remove the possibility for market 
participants to characterise section 172 as an exogenous factor that forces short-termist 
behaviour regardless of internal preferences. Reform in this direction could potentially 
do the same job as proposals to introduce alternative types of business vehicle (such as 
the benefit corporation119  or the trust corporation120) but arguably with less disruption. 
                                               
118 Company Law Review Steering Group, Developing the Framework (URN 00/656, 2000), para 3.49. 
119 One potential advantage of the adoption of a specific alternative business form is that the provision of 
a clear ‘menu’ of different models with pre-defined features may overcome barriers that inhibit private 
contracting: J.E. Hasler, ‘Contracting for Good: How Benefit Corporations Empower Investors and 
Redefine Shareholder Value (2014) 100 Virginia Law Review 1279. On the other hand, a proliferation of 
different and potentially untested business models could bring with it new, unanticipated and 
unintended issues. Early examination has suggested significant deficiencies in the benefit corporation 
reporting framework: J. Haskell Murray, ‘An Early Report on Benefit Reports’ (2015) 118 Virginia Law 
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One obvious weak spot of suggestions to explore the scope for more optionality within 
the UK system is that this could be a rather pointless exercise if there is little or no 
demand for it among companies and investors. But there are sufficient prominent 
voices calling for a different type of capitalism to suggest that the effort could be 
worthwhile. Perceptions as to what constitutes ‘best practice’ can change. A facilitative 
approach is at least preferable to the alternative of attempting to force change in 
difficult areas through heavy-handed intervention. From the corporate mobility 
standpoint, a virtuous circle whereby enhanced optionality improves the UK’s ability to 
attract and/or retain well-run global companies with different ownership structures 
and that, in turn, fosters more ownership diversity among domestic companies can be 
envisaged. 
 
(E) Conclusion  
 
The prospect of losing business through corporate emigration may not currently weigh 
too heavily on the minds of those responsible for shaping company law policy in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Review 25., The establishment of new business forms may be unnecessary if the reforms needed to 
facilitate diverse success models can be achieved within the existing unitary, yet flexible, corporate law 
framework. 
120 C. Mayer, Firm Commitment (OUP 2013). 
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UK (or for contributing the UK’s views to the development of company law at the EU 
level). The number of companies migrating from the UK remains tolerably low, and 
(helped by a favourable tax regime) there is traffic the other way to attenuate the impact 
of emigration.121 The popular association of corporate migration with tax or regulatory 
avoidance creates reputational disincentives that should militate against the risk of 
mass exodus in the immediate future.122 There is also the practical matter of costs, 
including exit taxes associated with the moving of tax residency, which remain 
permissible and so add to the price of exit.123 Where the effect of corporate mobility is 
disaggregation or unbundling of the governing corporate, tax and/or listing regimes, 
                                               
121 Some companies (eg Fiat) have just moved their tax base to the UK whilst retaining foreign corporate 
nationality but others (eg Noble Corpn, which moved from Switzerland to the UK in 2013 (having moved 
to Switzerland from the Cayman Islands in 2009; and also the formerly US companies mentioned in n 9 
above) have also changed their corporate nationality.  Changes in UK taxation drove Beazley’s return to 
the UK in 2016, n 21 above. 
122 Since UK companies are tax resident in the UK by virtue of incorporation, a change of corporate 
nationality would be needed to migrate to a different tax regime (subject to double tax treaties).  
123 Case C-371/10 National Grid Indus BV v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/kantoor Rotterdam [2011] ECR I-
12273 where the Court decided that the imposition of an exit tax is not, of itself, contrary to EU law 
(subject to proportionality). This decision has been reaffirmed since: Case C-38/10 Commission v Portugal.  
But exit charges that go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective of preserving the coherence of 
the domestic tax systems and the balanced allocation of taxation powers are not permitted: Case C-64/11 
Commission v Spain; Case C-261/11 Commission v Denmark. 
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the ongoing compliance costs may be especially significant. Nevertheless, it would be 
myopic not to acknowledge that as the options to escape through reincorporation 
expand, the discretionary policy space must inevitably become more constrained.  
 
The rise of corporate mobility performs a valuable function by refocusing attention on 
the enabling/mandatory balance within company law. Corporate mobility erodes legal 
immutability – at least for the sophisticated actors who can afford to access the relevant 
technologies and live with the consequences of operating under multiple legal regimes. 
Fighting fire with fire can be dangerous but in this context it may hold a key to ensuring 
continued policy effectiveness. Exploring the possibilities for more optionality within 
company law (broadly interpreted) holds considerable promise. Done well and with 
appropriate safeguards to contain the inevitable downside risks, this approach could be 
expected to lessen the incentives for domestic companies to explore the options offered 
by expanded choice between systems. It would make the emergence of an uneven 
playing field – where smaller (ie less well-resourced) companies bear the brunt of 
heavy-handed interventions that eventually turn out to be policy mistakes – less likely. 
By being more accommodating of robust governance features that are less familiar in 
the UK context because of the predominance of the dispersed shareholder model, it 
could be good for competitiveness. And, crucially, by fostering diversity and plurality, 
it could help to moderate the extremes of shareholder primacy and thereby advance the 
fundamental policy objective for companies to achieve their social purpose.   
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This is not, it is worth emphasising, a battle cry for mass deregulation ― company law 
requires a significant mandatory element ― but the appropriate combination of 
mandatory and enabling rules is not static and must evolve in response to changing 
market conditions, such as the growth of extended choice between systems of company 
law. And, notwithstanding the rise of new factors, it is not breaking new ground to 
stress the merits of a facilitative and flexible approach to company law. As the review 
group that led the reforms that became the UK Companies Act 2006 explained:  ‘there is 
an almost infinitely diverse range of businesses and business philosophies and there 
needs to be a correspondingly wide variety of systems of company governance. These 
systems must be free to develop in changing economic, social and technological 
conditions. In providing an optimal climate for disciplined and efficient governance, 
company law must encourage, not suppress, this variety and flexibility.’124  Recent calls 
for a more flexible UK system that would encourage companies to consider divergent 
control structures (to quote Martin Wolf of the Financial Times:  ‘let 100 governance 
flowers bloom’ 125) are a sign that these aspirations have not been met.  There is 
unfinished business.  
 
                                               
124 Company Law Review Steering Group, Developing the Framework , n 118 above, para 2.6.  
125 Martin Wolf, Opportunist Shareholders Should Embrace Commitment (Keynote speech,  ICGN 
Conference, London 2015), at https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/Martin%20Wolf%20speech.pdf.  
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